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1. Introduction
An action or judgement is implicitly biased when it is 
influenced by automatic mental processes which distort 
action or judgement (often without this influence being 
apparent to the individual). These automatic mental 
processes are pervasively found: around 70% of the 
millions who have completed a racial Implicit Association 
Test (IAT) on the Project Implicit website show an implicit 
preference for White/light-skin over Black/dark-skin 
(Nosek et al., 2007). Although recent meta-analyses have 
revealed a relatively low correlation between IAT results 
and overt behaviour (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, 
& Banaji, 2009; Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & 
Tetlock, 2013), the societal impact of implicit biases 
has been argued to be significant due to the presence 
of bias in large numbers of people, and the cumulative 
effects on individuals of the repeated expression of bias 
(Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2015; Buttrick et al., 2020; 
Kurdi et al., 2019; See also collected authors in Schwlenker 
2017 for responses to scepticism about the presence and 
effects of implicit biases). A large body of research has 
indicated such processes could influence behaviour in 
a wide range of contexts. Examples include: differential 
evaluations of the same CVs where the only difference 
was race (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000) — similar effects 
were found for gender (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2007) and 
age (Lindner, Graser, & Nosek, 2014) — differential micro-
behaviours which display tension and discomfort on the 
part of White interlocutors, and which inflect the quality 
of interracial interactions (Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, 
& Hodson, 2002); and in simulations people mistakenly 
‘shoot’ unarmed Black individuals more frequently than 
unarmed White individuals —so called ‘shooter bias’ 
(Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Correll, Park, 
Judd, Wittenbrink, & Sadler, 2007; Plant, & Peruche, 2005).
Importantly, though, in the past decade, research has 
shown implicit biases are malleable (Lai et al., 2014) and 
their influence on behaviour can be limited, to some 
degree. Strategies that have, with varying degrees of 
success, been shown to mitigate the expression of implicit 
bias include: attention to counter-stereotypical exemplars 
(Blair, 2002); the use of implementation intentions to alter 
patterns of response (Webb, Sheeran, & Pepper, 2010); and 
the inhibition of automatic associations due to negative 
affect, such as guilt (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 
2007). This suggests implicit biases may be influenced 
6FDLIH5HWDO7R%ODPH"7KH(1言eFWVRI0RUDOL]HG
)HHGEDFNRQ,PSOLFLW5DFLDO%LDV&ROODEUD3V\FKRORJ\
'2,KWWSVGRLRUJFROODEUD
7KH8QLYHUVLW\RI6KH1贀eOG*%
&RUUHVSRQGLQJDXWKRU5RELQ6FDLIHUVFDLIH#VKH1贀eOGDFXN)
6FDLIHHWDO7R%ODPH"7KH(1言eFWVRI0RUDOL]HG)HHGEDFNRQ,PSOLFLW5DFLDO%LDV$UWۃSDJHۃRI
by other processes, which themselves may be implicit, 
automatic or otherwise non-conscious. Bias mitigation 
strategies have been incorporated into models of implicit 
bias training (IBT) (Devine et al., 2012), although the 
effects of such strategies on reducing bias have been 
mixed (Forscher et al., 2017). Some research indicates 
that merely attributing behaviour to implicit bias rather 
than explicit bias reduces perceived accountability and 
makes people less likely to support efforts to combat it 
(Daumeyer et al., 2019).
One notable feature of many instances of IBT is the 
exculpatory tone adopted in communicating about 
implicit bias. Popular implicit bias training resources—like 
those made public by Facebook, Google and Starbucks—
all adopt an exculpatory tone. For example Facebook’s 
‘Managing Unconscious Bias’ training (see https://
managingbias.fb.com/) describes getting a biased IAT 
score as indicating that you are a product of the world 
around you and emphasizes that it is not a comment on 
who you are as a human being. This is consistent with 
the recommendation, from Moss-Racusin et al. (2014), 
that the design of IBT should ‘avoid assigning blame’ to 
participants (615). However, the existing evidence about 
the efficacy of negative or moralised feedback on the 
manifestation of implicit bias is equivocal. Some studies 
suggest that negative feedback about implicit bias 
provokes backlash or hostility (Legault et al., 2011). Other 
research has indicated interpersonal confrontations may 
be an effective way of regulating the expression of racial 
bias (Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006) which could be 
consistent with an immediate hostile reaction to negative 
feedback.
In this series of studies, we seek to investigate the 
impact of tone of feedback (exculpatory, blaming or 
neutral) on individuals’ implicit racial biases, emotions, 
and intentions to change behaviours. These studies are the 
first to address this issue. The research goes beyond that of 
Legault et al. (2011), who focused on external pressures to 
avoid prejudice, rather than blame and exculpation. The 
latter evoke moral standards that individuals subscribe to 
and are motivated to uphold. These studies go beyond the 
moralised feedback used by Czopp et al. (2006) which was 
delivered through an online messenger interface. We use 
specifically moralized feedback (exculpation and blame) 
delivered in person, in conditions that are good proxies 
for those of IBT: from an ‘authority’ figure, to participants 
who are motivated to avoid prejudice. Some research 
suggests that activating feelings of guilt might be an 
effective way of mitigating the expression of implicit bias 
(Moskowitz & Li 2011), and other research has examined 
how individuals react to feedback about their IAT scores 
(Schlachter & Rolf 2017; Howell et al., 2017) or to public 
discourses about implicit biases in general (Yen, Durrheim 
& Tafarodi 2018). However, no research has paid attention 
to the efficacy (or otherwise) of moralised feedback. There 
is evidence that informing individuals that implicitly 
biased behaviour is pervasive increases the expression 
of implicit bias (perhaps due to fostering complacency) 
in the absence of also establishing a strong moral norm 
against such behaviour (Duguid & Thomas-Hunt, 2015). 
This suggests setting a strong exculpatory tone may in 
fact not help with – and may hinder – the mitigation of 
implicit bias, or the explicit motivation to change.
In sum, we have no direct evidence about whether the 
standard practice in IBT, of adopting an exculpatory tone, 
is likely to help or hinder individuals in getting them 
to modify their implicit and explicit attitudes. Our pre-
registered experiment is the first to provide such evidence.
This is also important because wider discussions have, 
despite equivocal empirical evidence, taken the view that 
blame is counter-productive and should be avoided. For 
example, it has been argued blame should be avoided 
because it is likely to make people less motivated to change 
(Saul 2013), and that blaming might prevent ‘buy in’ to 
norms against implicit bias (Vargas 2017). Further, the 
idea that implicit bias attributions might let individuals 
‘off the hook’ for their discriminatory behaviour has led 
some to worry about appeals to implicit biases (Beckles-
Raymond 2020). These wider discussions, as well as best 
practice for IBT, can be informed by evaluating the impact 
of tone (blaming or exculpatory) on implicit biases, and 
on intentions to change attitudes and behaviour.
It is important to note that our research focuses on the 
efficacy (positive or negative effects) of blaming, rather 
than the warrant (whether it is deserved) for exculpation 
or blame. The warrant issue is distinct from that of the 
efficacy of blame or exculpation. Warrant for blame 
depends on the separate question of responsibility for 
implicitly biased actions – this issue has been addressed 
extensively elsewhere (Holroyd, 2012; Holroyd, 2015; 
Holroyd & Kelly, 2015; Holroyd, Scaife & Stafford, 2017a; 
Washington & Kelly, 2016), and we set it aside here. Our 
focus is on efficacy, namely, what the impact is of adopting 
an exculpatory, neutral, or blaming tone in delivering 
feedback about implicit bias. Addressing this question 
does not take on any commitments regarding whether 
individuals are (solely or collectively) responsible for 
having or acting on implicit biases.
The importance of developing a detailed understanding 
of the impact of exculpatory or condemnatory moral 
communications concerning implicit bias is compounded 
by the ever-increasing availability of information about 
our own biases, through online tests such as those at 
projectimplicit.com, in addition to institutionally provided 
implicit biases training or reports in the media. This 
means it is imperative to address the issue of how the tone 
of such communications impacts upon the expression of 
implicit bias and readiness to modify implicit and explicit 
attitudes.
2. Method and Results
2.1. Overview of Research Strategy
We conducted a series of experiments culminating in 
a pre-registered test of the hypothesis that our blame 
intervention reduces IAT scores compared to a neutral 
communication. We also included several exploratory 
measures to investigate participant’s behavioural inten-
tions and self-awareness.
We report how we determined our sample size for the 
pre-registered experiment, all data exclusions (if any), all 
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manipulations, and all measures in the study. In addition, 
we share all experimental materials, files for running the 
experiments, data and analysis scripts (https://osf.io/
awq2c/).
For the purposes of empirically investigating implicit 
bias we will be equating the phenomenon with 
performance on indirect attitude measures such as the 
‘shooter bias’ test and the IAT. Focusing on the output of 
indirect measures does little to define the phenomenon 
because it does not ensure that any bias measured in this 
way must always have the features commonly associated 
with being implicit. Biases measured using the IAT may 
or may not be outside the agent’s awareness, may or may 
not be aligned with the agent’s explicit attitudes, and 
the picture surrounding the agent’s ability to control or 
alter the bias is certainly unclear (though the responses 
are required to be fast which inhibits deliberate control). 
For these reasons we have also included explicit questions 
regarding the participants’ awareness and explicit 
attitudes in our research to gain further insight. For 
the purpose of this research we have also assumed that 
implicit biases must be unendorsed. This is because we 
are focusing on attitude change and believe that altering 
a bias that conflicts with explicitly held attitudes is likely 
to require a different approach to altering a bias that is 
explicitly endorsed. We resist giving any more detailed 
definition of implicit bias because, as we have argued in 
detail elsewhere (see Holroyd, Scaife & Stafford 2017b), 
there are no unproblematic ways of characterising implicit 
biases and adopting any definition requires committing 
to prior theoretical assumptions that we need not take 
on here.
2.2. Experiment 1
The first experiment was designed to test for a baseline 
measure of implicit prejudice in our sample and check for 
any effect of answering explicit attitude questions (to do 
with moral attitudes) on IAT scores.
3DUWLFLSDQWV
Participants were 83 students from the University of 
Sheffield (62 female, 21 male; Mean age: 21.66).
Ethnicity: White = 53, Asian/British Asian = 12, 
Chinese = 11, Mixed, multiple ethnic groups = 4, Arab = 1, 
Black = 1, Other = 1.
3URFHGXUH	0DWHULDOV
Participants took two IATs; one race: Black/White IAT 
made up of positive and negative words and images of 
White and Black young faces cropped at forehead and 
chin. The other IAT looked for associations with religion 
(Muslim/non-Muslim) made up of positive and negative 
words and typical Muslim and Christian biblical names 
common to a UK population. Implicit Association Tests 
(IAT) were built using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007) based 
on a procedure developed by Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz (1998) & Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, (2003). 
The experiment code was published for community use 
as ‘OpenIAT’ (See https://osf.io/i8yj5/ Stafford & Scaife, 
2014). The race version used images from Project Implicit 
stimulus materials (Nosek et al., 2007). The religion 
version used typical Muslim and Christian biblical names. 
See supplementary information for details of both IATs.
Participants also answered a number of explicit attitude 
questions covering their attitudes towards: the racial and 
religious groups which were the focus of the IATs, racial 
and religious integration, and moral norms concerning 
the equal treatment of racial and religious groups (see 
supplementary information). In order to allow us to check 
for any influence on IAT scores caused by considering 
the issues raised in the explicit questions the order was 
counter-balanced so half the participants answered the 
explicit attitude questions before taking the two IATs and 
half after taking the two IATs.
5HVXOWV
The IAT results were commensurate with those found in 
the wider literature. As shown in Figure 1, the participants 
had a significantly non-zero implicit preference for 
White over Black faces (mean race IAT score: +0.48, 
SD 0.56) t(82) = 7.88, p < 0.000001) and a slightly smaller 
preference for non-Muslim over Muslim names (mean 
religion +0.37 SD 0.58 t(81) = –5.88, p < 0.000001). This 
provides an important demonstration that implicit anti-
Black and anti-Muslim biases are replicated when IATs 
are conducted using a UK sample. The explicit attitude 
questions indicated that participants had no explicit 
racial or religious preferences and that they believed it 
unacceptable to judge people on these social identities.
An analysis of the impact of answering the explicit 
questions before taking the IATs (mean = +0.43, SD 0.47) 
rather than after (mean = +0.41, SD 0.38) indicated that 
there was no significant order effect t(81) = 0.22576, 
p = 0.822. Effect Size 0.02 [CI –0.40 +0.46] (this and all 
effect sizes reported in this paper are Cohen’s d).
An equivalence test (Lakens, 2017; Lakens, Scheel & 
Isager, 2018) was conducted. The equivalence test was 
non-significant, t(78.64) = 1.590, p = 0.0579, given 
equivalence bounds of –0.171 and 0.171 (on a raw scale) 
and an alpha of 0.05. The equivalence test bounds were 
based on a medium sized effect of 0.4 d. This suggests 
the observed effect is statistically not different from zero 
and statistically not equivalent to zero. This indicates that 
considering moral judgements about race and ethnicity 
did not impact on the expression of implicit bias on 
either IAT.
2.3. Experiment 2
The second experiment was designed to test the impact 
of two interpersonal moral communications on implicit 
bias scores. The moral communication of blame was 
anticipated to activate guilt, which may reduce the 
expression of implicit bias (Moskowitz & Li, 2011). The 
focus on a race IAT was partly because experiment 1 found 
more prejudiced scores on the race IAT than on the religion 
IAT and partly because of complexities in identifying what 
social identity was tracked by the religion IAT (participants’ 
biases that target Muslim identity may include racialized 
components as well as assumptions about geographical 
origins, religious or doctrinal commitments).
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Participants were 121 students from the University of 
Sheffield. 5 participants were excluded from all the 
experiment 2 analyses either because their understanding 
of English was poor or they did not engage with the task 
properly. This left 116 participants (87 female, 29 male; 
Mean age: 19.66). Ethnicity: White = 91 East Asian = 18 
South Asian= 5 Black = 1 Mixed = 1.
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Race IAT as used in experiment 1.
‘Shooter bias’ test built using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007) 
based on the task and using the images from ‘The police 
officer’s dilemma’ (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 
2002). This task was selected precisely because the 
behaviour engaged (shooting, albeit simulated) is liable 
to moral evaluation and so makes moralized feedback 
(blame or exculpation) appropriate.
Explicit attitude questions, including moral attitudes: 
see supplementary information.
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Having completed the information and consent form 
(approved by the Department of Psychology, University 
of Sheffield) participants were seated at a laptop in a 
small room with the door open to a larger room where 
the experimenter was based at a computer desk. The 
experimenter gave participants a brief introduction to the 
study in which they were told that after the first task was 
finished they would be provided with feedback on their 
performance before they could move onto the second 
part of the experiment. Participants then undertook the 
shooter bias test. The instructions informed them to ‘shoot’ 
armed targets and to ‘not shoot’ unarmed targets. They 
were also told they have less than a second (0.85s) to make 
each decision. Targets were Black and White males who 
appeared on complex backgrounds either holding guns or 
non-weapon objects such as phones or drinks cans. The 
task was made up of 80 trials (20 Black armed, 20 Black 
unarmed, 20 White armed, 20 White unarmed) presented 
in a random order. After each choice, the participant was 
presented with feedback text on the screen indicating 
either: ‘Correct choice’ or ‘Error’. If the participant took 
longer than 0.85 of a second to respond the trial timed 
out and the ‘too slow’ feedback was presented. Once the 
shooter bias task was over the experimenter gave the 
appearance of running some analysis code and looking 
at a graph supposedly representing the participant’s 
responses. Following this the experimenter delivered one 
of two types of ‘feedback’ depending on which condition 
the participant was in. Participants in the blame condition 
where told:
‘You have just taken the shooter bias test, which 
is intended to measure differences in attitudes 
towards racial groups that you might not explic-
itly endorse. I’m afraid that the differences in your 
reaction times and shooting choices indicate you 
have negative implicit attitudes towards Black peo-
ple. Morally speaking, we would hope people don’t 
have these kinds of attitudes. People who have these 
kinds of attitudes tend to behave in discriminatory 
ways, even if it is so subtle that you don’t notice it. 
Overall, you are blameworthy for having these dis-
criminatory attitudes and behaviours. As you prob-
ably know, it is morally unacceptable to have biased 
attitudes and behaviours; it would be quite normal 
to feel guilty about this; and to think about how to 
Figure 1: Scores on two IATs for 83 participants in experiment 1.
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change these attitudes, or your behaviours to bring 
them in line with moral expectations. Later, in the 
debrief, we can talk more about techniques people 
have used to try to eliminate these bad attitudes. 
There’ll also be the chance to ask any questions you 
may have. Now that you’ve got the results of this 
part of the study, we’ll give you a moment to reflect 
on that, and then move on to the next part of the 
study.’
This communication included key components of a variety 
of views on the nature of blame: it included the expression 
of a shared moral standard to which the individual is 
expected to adhere, and has fallen short (‘we would hope 
you don’t have these attitudes’; ‘it is morally unacceptable 
to have biased attitudes and behaviours’); expression of 
emotional response (‘I’m afraid that…’); anticipated emotive 
responses (‘it would be normal to feel guilty about this’); 
and reaffirmation of the moral standard (‘think about how 
to change these attitudes, or your behaviours …’) (Wallace, 
1994; Strawson, 1962; Bennett, 2002; Fricker, 2014). It 
is important to note the text above is not supposed to 
capture a ‘folk’ conception of blame; rather to present a 
theoretical construct that may overlap with a variety of 
different conceptions of blame. The manipulation aimed 
to incorporate different components of various views on 
blame, capturing all components that may be critical for 
the purposes of efficacy, whilst avoiding construing blame 
so narrowly as to misalign with any one participant’s 
understanding of blame. So, for example, we did not 
include reference to the idea that implicit bias is due to the 
culture you live in, although this is a common trope, since 
this claim would provide a basis for participants to contest 
the blame. Moreover, the blame was communicated in a 
low emotional tone, in accordance with the finding that 
individuals most readily recognised such responses as 
blaming ones (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014). The 
blaming communication is not supposed to be universal, 
but to capture the components of blame that we expected 
to resonate with UK populations. It may be that a different 
blame manipulation would be required for a different 
audience with different background assumptions about 
moral communications. Participants in the exculpation 
condition where given the same feedback except that 
rather than being told they are blameworthy and it would 
be normal to feel guilty, they were informed that they 
are entirely blameless, not culpable, and should not feel 
guilty (see full exculpation script below).
‘You have just taken the shooter bias test, which 
is intended to measure differences in attitudes 
towards racial groups that you might not explic-
itly endorse. I’m afraid that the differences in your 
reaction times and shooting choices indicate that 
you have negative implicit attitudes towards Black 
people. Morally speaking, we would hope people 
don’t have these kinds of attitudes, but it is actu-
ally entirely blameless. People who have these atti-
tudes tend to behave in discriminatory ways, but 
it is so subtle you don’t notice it, and you aren’t 
culpable for doing so. It would be quite easy to feel 
guilty about these attitudes and behaviours, but 
you shouldn’t. In fact, it would be great if you were 
concerned to consider the various steps that can 
be taken to change these attitudes, or your behav-
iours. Later, in the debrief, we can talk more about 
techniques people have used to try to eliminate 
these attitudes. There’ll also be the chance to ask 
any questions you may have. Now that you’ve got 
the results of this part of the study, we’ll give you 
a moment to reflect on that, and then move on to 
the next part of the study.’
Some participants interrupted their feedback with 
comments (typically trying to either explain or deny their 
bias), or with questions (typically about the test or how 
common implicit bias is). When this occurred, they were 
told ‘There will be a chance for you to make comments 
and ask questions in the debrief at the end. For now please 
continue with the experiment.’ After receiving their 
‘feedback’ participants answered a number of explicit 
attitude questions from experiment 1 (see supplementary 
information) and undertook the race IAT from experiment 
1. At the end of the experiment participants also took 
part in a task where they were asked to rate the suitability 
of Black or White job candidates. This was designed to 
evaluate the impact of our intervention on behavioural 
tasks. However, the task did not yield any significant results, 
partly because the participants seemed to be overly keen 
to demonstrate they were not racist by over-evaluating the 
suitability of Black candidates (see report on additional 
measures for more details at https://osf.io/sjz5t/). This 
indicates a moral or social norm to avoid anti-Black racism 
was clearly evoked and felt by the participants. After 
the experiment participants were thoroughly debriefed 
regarding the scripted nature of their feedback.
5HVXOWV
There was no significant difference between the IAT 
scores of participants in the blame (mean +0.18, SD 0.78) 
and exculpation (mean +0.24, SD 0.67) manipulations 
t(113.32) = 0.37629, p = 0.7074, effect size d = 0.035 
[CI –0.33 +0.40]. Both means are considerably lower than 
the baseline scores from experiment 1 (see Figure 2).
An equivalence test (Lakens, 2017; Lakens, Scheel 
& Isager, 2018) was conducted. The equivalence test 
was significant, t(113.32) = 1.781, p = 0.0388, given 
equivalence bounds of –0.292 and 0.292 (on a raw scale) 
and an alpha of 0.05. The equivalence test bounds were 
based on a medium sized effect of 0.4 d. This suggests that 
the observed effect is statistically not different from zero 
and statistically equivalent to zero.
The explicit questions indicated many participants in 
the exculpation manipulation reported feeling blamed 
(23 out of 56) and/or guilty (49 out of 56). This suggests 
the exculpation manipulation was not successful in 
producing feelings of exculpation. The attribution of self-
blame, or feelings of guilt – irrespective of whether blame 
or exculpation was communicated by the experimenter – 
may then have driven the effects. This would mean that 
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the exculpation condition would not be a valid test of 
the effects of actually removing blame or guilt (though 
it may be a good test of attempts to remove blame or 
guilt, if people generally tend to feel guilt in the face of 
exculpatory messages).
Explicit attitude questions confirmed that whilst 
demonstrating a non-zero IAT, nearly all our participants 
indicated that it is both socially and morally unacceptable 
to make judgements about people based on their race.
2.4. Six month follow up
3DUWLFLSDQWV
Participants were 60 students from the University of 
Sheffield all of whom had taken part in experiment 2. 
Participants were from both conditions of experiment 2 
(36 from the blame condition, 24 from the exculpation 
condition). 46 Female, 14 Male. Mean age 19.67. Ethnicity: 
White = 50 East Asian = 9 South Asian = 1.
0DWHULDOV
Race IAT as used in experiment 1.
Explicit attitude questions: see supplementary 
information.
3URFHGXUH
Participants were recruited via email invitation. Partici-
pants took our race IAT and answered a number of 
explicit questions about their experience of experiment 2 
and how it had affected them since (see supplementary 
information).
5HVXOWV
We found participants’ IAT scores (mean +0.42, SD 0.59) 
had returned to levels commensurate with participants 
from experiment 1 who had not engaged in a moral 
communication (mean +0.48, SD 0.56). The IAT showed 
only a weak test re-test reliability (Pearson r = 0.26 (p = 
0.047), Spearman’s rank correlation = 0.29 (p = 0.023)); 
but it should be noted this is not a pure assessment of 
test-retest reliability, since participants at time 1 were in 
one of the two moral communication conditions (blame 
or exculpation). Note the wider literature estimates 
test-retest reliability of the IAT as modest -typically 
between r = .5 or r = .6 (Nosek 2007, Greenwald et al., 
2015) – although the interval used for those retests is 
substantially shorter than the 6 month gap between tests 
in our research.
We also asked participants about their experience 
of taking part in experiment 2. The highest emotion 
ratings on a 1 to 7 scale were for feeling guilty (mean 
5.12, SD 1.6) and being upset (mean 4.4, SD 1.68). Full 
details of participant’s emotional ratings can be found 
in the supplementary information. Despite reporting 
these strong negative emotional responses over 90% of 
participants said they were glad they took part in the 
experiment. 68% of participants reported that taking 
part in the experiment had made them less likely to make 
prejudiced judgments and 68% reported that they had 
done something to try to ensure they treat all people 
equally since taking part in the initial experiment (note 
that these two 68% groups are made up of different 
but mostly overlapping participants). No participants 
indicated strong regret about taking part and only 3% 
expressed mild regret about having taken part. We note 
that selective recruitment is likely to bias these results 
(i.e., that participants with higher regrets would be less 
likely to participate in follow up testing).
2.5. Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was pre-registered (https://osf.io/94pur/) 
to confirm a difference on IAT scores when participants 
experience blame for the implicit associations (the 
Figure 2: Mean IAT scores on race IAT by experiment & condition.
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blame condition from experiment 2) compared to a no 
blame control (similar to the no feedback condition of 
experiment 1). One reason for conducting this study was 
to test if the difference persisted when the control group 
was specifically designed to mimic the experimental 
condition in all respects except the blame feedback. This 
allowed us to rule out that factors such as taking the 
shooter bias test caused practice effects or contributed 
towards the observed difference between the two groups 
in any other way. Another reason for focusing on blame 
rather than exculpation is that experiment 2 showed it 
was hard to design an exculpatory communication which 
didn’t provoke feelings and reactions similar to those that 
result from being blamed. Thus, it is important to confirm 
whether responses to blame are counter-productive or 
constructive, compared to a neutral communication. 
Statistical power analysis determined that a sample of 
160 would be adequate, assuming a minimum effect size 
of interest of 0.4 and 80% power). This minimum effect 
size was based on analysis comparing the IAT scores of 
participants in experiment 1 to scores of those in the 
blame condition from experiment 2, which showed a 
standardised difference of means of 0.45. As well as 
the outcome variable supporting the pre-registered 
comparison (IAT scores after the blame vs no feedback 
manipulation), a number of other variables were included 
for exploratory analysis. These include explicit behavioural 
intentions (building on the findings from experiment 
2b), self-awareness of bias (as previously investigated by 
Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, & Blair, 2014) and intellectual humility 
(as previously investigated by McElroy et al., 2014). We 
report these here, insofar as they directly complement 
understanding of how blame impacted on participant’s 
attitudes, and report fully all measures and data in the 
online supplementary material. We note that the pre-
registered component of experiment 3 refers only to 
the effect of the manipulation on the primary outcome 
variable, namely, IAT scores after the manipulation.
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All 162 participants were students from the University 
of Sheffield (100 female, 61 male, 1 agender). Mean age 
20.34.
Ethnicity: White (British/White British/Caucasian/
English/European/Greek Cypriot): 134 (83%), South 
Asian (British Asian/Asian Indian/Pakistani/Indian/South 
Asian): 9 (6%), East Asian (Asian/Chinese/Vietnamese/
Burmese): 10 (6%), Mixed: 5 (3%), White Asian: 2 (1%), 
Black (Black British/Caribbean): 2 (1%).
No participants were completely excluded from the 
analysis but 3 participants were excluded from most of 
the analysis (2 for demonstrating an awareness of our 
hypothesis in the post-experimental debriefing and 1 
for indicating racial preferences on the explicit attitude 
questions).
0DWHULDOV
Race IAT as used in experiment 1 and 2.
Shooter bias test as used in experiment 2.
Explicit attitude questions: see supplementary information.
Intellectual Humility Scale: 13-item scale developed by 
McElroy et al. (2014).
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The method was as in experiment 2 where all participants 
took the shooter bias test before receiving feedback 
except the exculpation condition was replaced by a 
control condition in which participants received a scripted 
response with no information about their performance 
and no moral evaluation. This was intended to provide 
an interpersonal communication without promulgating 
feelings of guilt in control participants, which were not 
eliminated by the exculpation communication used in 
experiment 2. Participants in the control condition were 
told the following:
‘You have just taken the first test, which is intended 
to measure your reactions to different stimuli that 
you might not be familiar with. I’ve just checked 
your data has come through OK. It won’t tell us 
anything meaningful until we have all the results 
in. Later, in the debrief, we can talk more about 
the nature of our research if you like. There’ll also 
be the chance to ask any questions you may have. 
Now that we’ve done this part of the study, we’ll 
give you a moment to rest, and then move on to 
the next part of the study.’
This ‘no feedback’ condition is a useful proxy for the 
context of IBT sessions in which participants are told 
about the phenomenon of implicit bias, but do not 
receive individualized feedback about IAT scores. As in 
experiment 2, after receiving their feedback participants 
answered a number of explicit attitude questions and 
undertook the race IAT. Following the IAT, experiment 
3 also included additional explicit questions to access 
participant’s future behavioural intentions, awareness 
of their own level of bias, emotional responses, and an 
intellectual humility scale. After this but before the debrief 
participants also completed a seating distance measure 
and a voluntary time commitment assessment which were 
intended to monitor the potential behavioural impact of 
the intervention.
5HVXOWV
The raw data and analysis scripts are available at: https://
osf.io/awq2c/.
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The mean IAT score for the blame group was +0.29 
(SD 0.58). The control mean was +0.39 (SD 0.60). The 
difference between these groups was not significant 
t(157) = 1.11, p = 0.135 (Cohen’s d effect size = 0.18, 
95% confidence interval –0.14, 0.49). These confidence 
intervals suggest the true effect of blaming individuals 
is more likely to be neutral or a reduction in implicit 
prejudice. The possibility that blame increases implicit 
prejudice by any non-small amount is actively precluded. 
Figure 2 below shows the variation in mean race IAT 
scores across all experiments and conditions, showing the 
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extent to which blame and exculpation manipulations 
reduce negative (anti-Black) implicit bias scores.
([SORUDWRU\$QDO\VLV
An equivalence test (Lakens, 2017; Lakens, Scheel & Isager, 
2018) was non-significant (t(159.82) = –1.467, p = 0.0722, 
given equivalence bounds of +/– 0.4 d, +/– 0.236 
on the raw scale, and an alpha of 0.05. Equivalence 
bounds based on the effect size of 0.4, used in the pre-
registration). This suggests that, although the IAT scores 
were not significantly different between conditions 
there was also insufficient evidence to conclude they are 
equivalent.
Behavioural Intentions:
Participants were asked: ‘Do you intend to try to change 
your future behaviour as a result of your experience 
in this experiment?’ This question provided evidence 
that the blame manipulation has a positive impact 
on people’s explicit intentions to change their future 
behaviour (mean 5.03, SD 1.77) when compared to the 
behavioural intentions of the control group (mean 3.48, 
SD 1.86), t(157) = 5.38, p < 0.000001. Effect size: d = 
0.85. This is so despite the fact that the communication 
of blame produced an atmosphere that was intense and 
uncomfortable for the participant, producing a significant 
increase in anxiety (blamed mean 3.46, SD 1.72, control 
mean 2.77 SD 1.67; t(160) = 2.60, p = 0.01. Effect size: d 
= 0.41). Furthermore, the degree of intended behaviour 
change  correlates positively with the degree to which 
participants felt blamed r(160) = 0.22, p = 0.0048. It also 
correlates positively with the degree to which  participants 
felt guilty r(160) = 0.17, p = 0.03.
3. Discussion
This research is the first to investigate the effects of 
blame on individuals’ implicit biases (with a planned, 
pre-registered, comparison) and the effect on intentions 
to change behaviours. This was done using a moral 
communication produced by a rich, ‘in person’ dialogue 
that could serve as a proxy for communication in the 
context of IBT. The results contradict the view that blaming 
people for implicit bias is a counterproductive approach 
to addressing implicit biases, either by increasing 
implicit bias, making people less motivated to change 
or preventing ‘buy in’ to the project of counteracting 
implicit bias. The findings suggest blaming does not 
increase implicit bias, as measured by the IAT, at least by 
any significant amount. The results are compatible with 
blame reducing IAT scores, but the current experiments 
were not sufficiently powered to distinguish between a 
zero and positive non-zero effect on IAT scores. Further 
research is needed to differentiate between these 
two conclusions. Exculpating communications were 
experienced as guilt provoking (experiment 2), but there 
was also no evidence these increased implicit racial biases 
(see Figure 2). Second, blaming responses were correlated 
with stronger intentions, as compared to no feedback, 
to change future behaviours to combat implicit bias 
and racial discrimination. This shows that assumptions 
about blame being problematic may be mistaken, both 
in relation to the impact on implicit biases, and explicit 
intentions to change.
Whilst our findings show blame does not itself reduce 
implicit bias, they do suggest that communications which 
are taken to have a moral flavour (such as the provision 
of moralised feedback on one’s personal implicit biases) 
can be important in motivating individuals to form 
explicit intentions to change behaviours influenced 
by implicit racial biases. Whilst our explicit emotional 
measures indicate that even the non-confrontational 
blame feedback caused a significant increase in anxiety, 
so did the communication of an exculpatory message. 
Moreover, these negative emotional reactions did not 
impact negatively on the reported intention to change 
behaviour. In fact, individuals who received the blaming 
manipulations showed the strongest expression of 
such intentions. This is consistent with earlier findings 
that guilt is efficacious in motivating commitments to 
behavioural change. Further analyses of the relative 
efficacy of communicating negative but non-moralised 
feedback versus negative but moralised feedback is 
required. It is worth noting that the ‘feedback’ involved 
in the moral communication tested in these studies was 
bogus feedback – it was not based on individual’s actual 
implicit bias measures, but consistently communicated 
that all participants expressed some anti-Black implicit 
bias (although our studies, in line with other work on 
implicit biases, suggest that this invariant feedback would 
have been accurate for most participants in ascribing 
them non-zero implicit bias).
Most interventions do not bring about long-term 
change in implicit bias (Lai et al., 2016). This may be true 
of our interventions in experiment 2, since a retest on 
50% of the participants 6 months later demonstrated that 
participants’ IAT scores returned to levels commensurate 
with those of participants from experiment 1 who had 
not engaged with a moral communication (although 
strong conclusions are precluded due to selective drop-
out from our follow up test). Accordingly, the finding that 
blame had an impact on individuals’ explicit intentions 
to change their behaviour is particularly important, since 
this may be the most significant driver of change. It is of 
course possible that the self-reported changes in explicit 
intentions are due to social desirability effects rather 
than individuals internalising the relevant moral norms. 
But this, after all, is a legitimate purpose of moralized 
feedback (to change social norms, due to either external 
or internal pressure). Note, moreover, that to the extent 
that social pressure explains the uniform commitment 
to anti-racist values in explicit questions, there is not the 
same uniformity in expressions of intentions to change 
attitudes and behaviour, suggesting that social pressure 
alone cannot account for the latter effect. Future studies 
could be devised to differentiate between these two 
explanations. It is however worth noting that even a shift 
caused by desirability effects could still be of great value, 
particularly if it can cause individuals to act to reduce 
their prejudice.
Another alternative interpretation of our findings, in the 
context of these remarks about guilt, is an ‘Aversive-Arousal 
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Reduction Hypothesis’ akin to the one considered by 
Batson (1991). This hypothesis explains individuals’ 
expressed commitments to change behaviour in terms 
of assuaging the social anxiety or discomfort that was 
produced by the moral communications. This explanation 
would undermine the proposal that blame is instrumental 
in producing constructive explicit attitudes, since the 
motivation to change would not really be about reducing 
racism or combating implicit biases; and the resolution 
to change would not outlive its role in reducing anxiety 
once the experience of taking part in the experiment is 
over. However, this interpretation is not supported by 
our findings. First, there is evidence that the motivation 
to change did indeed persist (from our six-month follow 
up of experiment 2). Moreover, when individuals were 
given an opportunity to escape social anxiety or feelings 
of guilt — those who were in the exculpation condition 
in experiment 2 — they did not take this opportunity; 
many individuals in the exculpation condition reported 
feeling self-blame and guilt. Accordingly, this alternative 
interpretation is not defensible on the basis of our findings.
Whilst the blame intervention in experiment 3 did not 
significantly decrease implicit bias scores, the results of 
our behavioural intention measure do provide a strong 
indication that blaming individuals has a positive impact 
on their explicit intentions to reduce their prejudice. 
Moreover, we found this indication on the basis of a one-
shot intervention: the cumulative effects of such moral 
communications, or of a pervasive moral norm against 
being influenced by implicit racial bias, may be even more 
powerful in terms of long-term changes in awareness, 
stronger or more motivationally effective moral emotions, 
and greater commitments to attitudinal and behavioural 
change.
One caveat for generalising this conclusion may be 
that our sample was made up of young people in higher 
education, who had indicated on an explicit attitude 
question that it was unacceptable to treat people differently 
based on race. This sample may be more receptive to 
feedback than the general population. However, where IBT 
is not mandatory, one would expect those who volunteer 
for such training to be similarly receptive to feedback, so 
this feature of our sample helpfully aligns with expected 
real-world scenarios in which tone of communication 
about implicit bias is important. Indeed, Howell et al. 
(2017) found participants assigned to take an IAT were 
more defensive in response to feedback indicating they 
have biased attitudes than those who self-selected to take 
part on the project implicit website. This defensiveness 
centred on the validity of the IAT or how accurately it 
reflected their attitudes. Those with this defensiveness 
were unlikely to intend to change their behaviour. In 
contrast those who felt the worst about their feedback 
were most willing to engage in bias reducing strategies. 
This supports the idea that blame causing negative affect 
may help motivate bias reducing behaviour change. 
However, a certain level of initial receptiveness may be 
required to ensure that the feedback is taken seriously.
Moreover, further studies are needed to identify which 
features of blame increase participant’s explicit intentions 
to change their behaviour and if these intentions have 
a significant impact on their actual future behaviour 
— including, for example, their engagement with 
other, more effective implicit bias reduction strategies. 
Further limitations of the present research are that it 
only investigated one type of blaming communication, 
where blame was delivered in a low emotion non-
confrontational manner by an unfamiliar member of 
psychology staff whom the participants are likely to 
view as an authority figure. However, again, this is likely 
to approximate the conditions in which feedback is 
delivered in IBT. Moreover, our study focused on a case in 
which there was high buy-in to the moral norm violated, 
as indicated by the self-report measures of explicit 
attitudes. This buy-in was recognised and emphasised in 
the moral communication, which made reference to the 
pervasive norm against racial bias (recall the wording: ‘as 
you probably know, it is morally unacceptable…’; ‘it would 
be quite normal to feel guilty…’; changing behaviours ‘to 
bring them into line with moral expectations…’). It may be 
that blame delivered in a more confrontational manner, 
by someone who stands in a different relationship to the 
individual being blamed, would produce different effects. 
Likewise, blame for the violation of a more controversial 
norm, or blame for violation of a norm that the individual 
does not endorse, may produce different effects. These 
possibilities could range from more significant decrease 
in bias (perhaps for more confrontational feedback) or 
even a rebound increase in bias (perhaps for violation of 
controversial norms). It could also be the case that the 
precise nature of the moral communication does not 
cause any significant differences. These are areas for 
further research.
Finally, caution is required in understanding the 
practical implications of these results, and their rele-
vance to current institutional practice. We noted that 
institutional training sessions tend to set an exculpatory 
tone, and that this is recommended ‘best practice’. Our 
findings challenge the assumption that anything but an 
exculpatory tone is counter-productive as we found no 
evidence that blame causes backlash. Whilst implicit racial 
biases did not significantly decrease, nor did they increase 
following blame. In fact, our behavioural intention 
measure provided evidence that blame seems efficacious in 
encouraging the explicit motivation to change behaviour. 
But that blame is efficacious in at least the formation 
of explicit intentions does not entail that we should 
blame. Exculpatory communications were experienced 
as producing guilt and self-blame, but appeared to be 
less effective in reducing bias or promoting intentions 
to change behaviour. Whether communications of blame 
or exculpation are all things considered justified may 
depend on further considerations, including questions 
concerning individual or collective moral responsibility 
for possessing and manifesting implicit bias (namely, 
the warrant for blame), and on the propriety of blaming 
responses — which may depend on the relationship of the 
blamer to the blamed. However, the current investigation 
suggests there are no reasons grounded in considerations 
of anticipated backlash to refrain from blaming (though 
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there may be others). Nor do they vindicate exculpation 
as the obviously efficacious strategy. This is the first 
set of experimental studies, including a pre-registered 
component, to investigate the important question of 
tone of delivery of feedback about implicit bias. The 
evidence from these studies points to the need for more 
future research, and supports critical reflection on the 
common practice of delivering implicit bias training in an 
exculpatory manner.
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